Peter Holmes is a Fellow of the UK Trade Policy Observatory and Emeritus Reader in Economics at the University of Sussex Business School.

The 2024 World Trade Organization (WTO) Public Forum was sure to be a fascinating occasion given the interest in the topic, inclusivity and green trade, and the stellar cast of speakers. But what of the future of the WTO itself? Many observers have come to feel that with the negotiating function and the Appellate Body (AB) both log-jammed, there wasn’t much for the WTO to do apart from hosting events like the Public Forum.

Despite the logjam in negotiations and the apparent death (certainly more than a very deep sleep) of the Appellate Body, the WTO is still delivering value to its members in its routine committee work. It continues to promote transparency etc, and Dispute Settlement Panels still operate, though more like the way they did in the GATT era. Among DS nerds there was sympathy for the idea put forward by Sunayana Sasmal and me^[1] that concerns over judicial overreach could be assuaged if the AB (if there were one) could decline to rule if the law was genuinely unclear. But as several Indian experts told us, if there is no AB, it’s not an issue.

The negotiations deadlock

Meanwhile, I only found one panel focussing on how to restore negotiations: our very own CITP panel on “Responsible Consensus”, i.e. persuading countries not to use their power to block decisions. It didn’t generate a lot of optimism. India, as well as the US, attracted quite a lot of criticism for its vigorous use of its legal right to veto moves that could affect its interests – even where there was a big majority of supporters. India’s position was elegantly and forcefully explained and defended by Prof Abhijt Das, an old friend of Sussex. He argued that even where other states might want to agree amongst themselves, India had a right to object to Plurilateral deals which might affect them adversely even when no actual obligations were created for them. But, interestingly, despite the delight of seeing many old friends from Delhi, there was little open official Indian engagement. It was striking that the Indian Foreign Minister chose last week to visit Geneva, to consult with UN agencies, but he didn’t visit the WTO. And there was no visible official US profile. On the other hand, China’s CGTN was listed as a Forum sponsor and hosted a lecture by Jason Furman, former senior adviser to Barack Obama.  On CGTN, the Chinese DDG Zhang Xiangchen stated how the public Forum, “is a platform for all to make their voices heard” and he “encourages more communication among stakeholders and calls on the active participation of developing countries for a balanced outcome.”

Inclusivity and dialogue

This echoed the message that WTO DG Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala pushed in the sessions she spoke at. It was spelled out in the first ever WTO Secretariat Strategy document.

The WTO Secretariat as a body is seeking to do more than just service the wishes of the Member States. It is seeking to act as a facilitator, convenor and broker, in the absence of, and perhaps to recreate, the missing consensus. Inclusivity and sustainability were being pushed in sessions organised by the Secretariat. The message was that we cannot assume globalisation will benefit everyone without action being taken. This was the underlying theme: the Forum offered Public Diplomacy on behalf of the organisation. Was it just bland PR?  One senior legal official told Sunayana and me that the WTO did seem to have found a way to create a new role and a new narrative for itself. The WTO had been very closely involved in the efforts to keep vaccine supply chains and some border crossings open during Covid, at the request of concerned parties and had brokered important agreements. It was “more important than ever”. The Secretariat is beginning to be more proactive and encouraging global dialogue.

Following these conversations, many of the observers we spoke to were somewhat sceptical, but not all. One of the UK’s leading trade specialists thought that this message of pro-active broader engagement was real and had been effective during the COVID period. Dr Ngozi has called for action on carbon pricing in an FT interview. If it could work, seeking to mobilise soft power rather than being the home of rulemaking and rule enforcement would be an excellent strategy. But there are pitfalls.  Would it be too controversial in the face of division among members? Is there a risk that the Secretariat could be seen as overreaching its legitimacy in the same way as the Appellate Body? Can the WTO really survive without its key rulemaking and enforcing role? And what if Trump wins?

Footnotes

^[1] https://blogs.sussex.ac.uk/uktpo/files/2024/02/Holmes_Sasmal_Not-Liquet-UKTPO-WP.pdf

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