The UK’s negotiation of a Free Trade Agreement with the EU will necessarily involve defining rules of origin, and before long negotiations with countries such as the US, Japan, and Australia will face the same task. In this Briefing Paper, the authors outline what rules of origin are, why they are needed, why they are complex, and which sectors in the UK may be most vulnerable to more restrictive rules of origin. They also discuss why the EU is highly unlikely to agree to the UK’s proposal on cumulation in rules of origin and argue that the obvious solution to this is for the UK to agree to the EU’s Pan Euro-Mediterranean Rules of Origin (PEM) which are the basis of the EU’s cumulation arrangements with a wide range of its neighbours. Any other outcome is likely to reduce the UK’s take up of trade preferences in its FTA with the EU. Read Briefing Paper 45: WE’RE GOING TO MAKE THEM AN OFFER THEY CAN REFUSE: RULES OF ORIGIN AND THE UK-EU FREE TRADE AGREEMENT

The UK’s draft text for the Free Trade Agreement with the EU indicates a vision of where the Government wishes to take the UK’s trade relationship with the EU. In some areas, the UK is unwilling to agree such deep integration as the Political Declaration foresaw and which the EU is seeking. However, in other areas, the UK is asking for more integration than the EU ordinarily offers partners in simple FTAs. This paper discusses four of these extensions in detail and provides further analysis of the implications for the negotiation process and future UK-EU trade. Read Briefing Paper 43: UK-EU FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: PLEASE, SIR, I WANT SOME MORE

The UK left the European Union on January 31, 2020. As the UK Government begins to develop the UK’s independent trade policy for the post-transition period, one part of the preparations is to establish the UK’s independent tariff schedule that will apply to goods imported into the UK. In February 2020, the Department for International Trade launched a public consultation concerning the UK’s applied Most Favoured Nation tariffs. This briefing paper outlines the proposals under consideration, discusses their potential implications, and provides our recommendations on the issues that we believe are important for the UK Government to consider when formulating the UK’s trade policy going forward. We explore the structure of the UK’s MFN tariff as a member of the EU and then analyse the potential impact of simplifying the tariff structure for firms, households, the environment and domestic policy objectives. Read Briefing Paper 39: RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE UK GOVERNMENT’S GLOBAL TARIFF PROPOSALS  

Economists have long argued, and with good justification, that international trade brings overall benefits to economies. However, increasing trade is likely to create losers as well as winners. As the UK prepares to leave the EU and have an independent trade policy it is important to understand how future trade agreements, or policy changes, may affect economic outcomes such as prices, productivity and output, and through these, individuals and regions. In this Briefing Paper, the authors provide a conceptual background of how trade changes may result in winners and losers – be these consumers, workers, regions, or industries, and give an overview of what the empirical evidence tells us about how developed economies have adjusted to changes in trade. They also consider potential policy responses that could help losers from international trade adjust, and ensure that the winners can take advantage of the new opportunities created by trade liberalisation. Read Briefing Paper 33 – WINNERS AND LOSERS FROM INTERNATIONAL TRADE: WHAT DO WE KNOW AND WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY? Launch and Panel Discussion at British Academy, 18 July 2019

In the case that the UK manages an orderly Brexit and has a transition period until the end of 2020, rather than just rolling over the existing agreements, what would be the possible options for future Free Trade Agreements? In the case of a future UK-Korea deal, the UK could potentially negotiate a new FTA built on the Korea-EU FTA (KorEU) or negotiate a completely new FTA modelled on the Korea-US FTA (KORUS). Our comparative analysis of KorEU and KORUS in services reveals that the two agreements took very different approaches for services trade liberalisation. Both achieved “GATS-plus” liberalisation commitments from Korea. KORUS seems to have achieved slightly more than KorEU. However, KORUS is more complicated and less transparent than KorEU. It also contains more WTO-inconsistent features. The KORUS option would enable the UK to better pursue its own specific needs since it would not be directly bound by KorEU. On the other hand, the WTO-inconsistent aspects of KORUS would need to be avoided, based on a clear vision of UK’s contribution towards the future multilateral trading system. Either way, the UK would face two stumbling blocks: the UK’s lack of negotiating power and the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clauses [...]

This paper assesses the possible consequences of the Government’s proposed No Deal tariff regime. While there have been numerous previous assessments of the economic impact of a ‘No Deal’, the tariff proposal by the UK Government provides a new set of tariffs which have not been assessed in the existing empirical literature. In this briefing paper, the authors explain carefully the Government’s proposals and identify how much of UK trade would be affected by the changes in tariffs in a ‘No Deal’ scenario and provide an empirical assessment of the scale of the economic challenge which could face UK industries in the event of ‘No Deal’. They find that a ‘No Deal’ Brexit will pose a significant challenge to the UK economy with a negative impact on output, exports and imports driven largely by the increased cost of trading with the EU. The results highlight that in the event of ‘No Deal’ the Government’s room for policy manoeuvre is somewhat limited. Read Briefing Paper 29 – Deal or ‘No Deal’? The economic consequences of the UK’s ‘No Deal’ tariffs

This Briefing Paper provides a comprehensive overview of the EU’s Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clauses on services and investment. It discusses their scope and the exceptions they contain, and then considers how these clauses are likely to limit the extent of concessions that the EU and its existing partners are prepared to grant the UK. Read Briefing Paper 25 – MOST FAVOURED NATION CLAUSES IN EU TRADE AGREEMENTS: ONE MORE HURDLE FOR UK NEGOTIATORS

In the search for a framework for a future UK-EU trade relationship, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the EU and Canada (CETA) has come under the spotlight. To inform the debate surrounding a potential ‘Canada plus’ model for the UK post-Brexit, this briefing paper provides an overview of the extent to which the EU restricts imports of services from Canada under CETA. The authors identify areas where ‘pluses’ may help to preserve existing levels of services trade between the UK and the EU post-Brexit, and discusses whether these are achievable. Further, the extent to which the EU’s commitments in CETA improve on pre-existing regimes is evaluated by comparing the degree of liberalisation in CETA with the EU’s prior commitments in the GATS. Read Briefing Paper 18 – Can CETA-plus solve the UK’s services problem?