Johnson’s alternative to the backstop would be just as ‘undemocratic’
27 August 2019
Alasdair Smith is an Emeritus Professor of Economics at the University of Sussex and is a member of the UK Trade Policy Observatory
The adjective ‘undemocratic’ has for a few weeks now been mysteriously attached to the Ireland backstop provision in the Withdrawal Agreement. The prime minister’s letter of August 19th to Donald Tusk, president of the EU Council, at least explained why: the backstop is said to be undemocratic because it binds the UK after Brexit into EU trade and regulatory policies in which it will have no say.
This is not a new idea. From early on in the Brexit debates, many economists assumed there would be compelling economic incentives for a post-Brexit UK to remain in the European Economic Area (EEA). Alan Winters pointed out that this would mean the UK would have to pay (financial contributions to the EU) and obey (EU rules) but with no say (in setting the rules). The Irish backstop is not the same as the […]
Briefing Paper 35 – BREXIT AND GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS: ‘NO-DEAL’ IS STILL COSTLY
A great deal of attention has been devoted to the consequences of different forms of post-Brexit trade policy for UK exports. But focusing on the gross value of UK exports – e.g. the decline in exports of completed cars as the cost of exporting to the EU rises – is only part of the story because it misses the effects on the sectors and other countries that supply inputs into UK goods. In this Briefing Paper, the authors unpack value chains to identify which sectors and countries create the value that is embodied in UK flows of exports and imports, and hence to identify how the changes in trade induced by a ‘No deal’ Brexit will affect the value contributed (i.e. the incomes generated) by different sectors and countries.
Studying only the effects of ‘No deal’ on the costs of conducting goods trade, but following them throughout the British economy, the authors find that ‘No deal’ could reduce UK GDP by 4% relative to remain. Moreover, because of the decline in incomes and the fact that services are key inputs into manufactured exports, the incomes generated in services sectors would also be around 4% smaller.
Read Briefing Paper 35 – BREXIT AND GLOBAL […]
A look at new UK pesticides regulation: Part 2
16 July 2019
Chloe Anthony, Ffion Thomas, and Dr Emily Lydgate – lecturer in Law at the University of Sussex and a fellow of the UK Trade Policy Observatory.
In May we published a blog analysing the EU Exit statutory instruments (SIs) on pesticides prepared under the EU Withdrawal Act 2018. One of the key concerns that we raised was that EU restrictions on pesticides with endocrine disrupting properties had been deleted. After this omission was identified, DEFRA responded very swiftly, clarifying that the deletion had been accidental and releasing a new Statutory Instrument (SI). […]
Hiccups that make us reel
15 July 2019
Dr Michael Gasiorek is a Senior Lecturer in Economics at the University of Sussex and Julia Magntorn Garrett is a Research Officer in Economics at the University of Sussex. Both are Fellows of the UK Trade Policy Observatory.
A favourite band (of at least one of the authors of this blog) from the 1980s was the Cocteau Twins (See, or rather listen to…Sugar Hiccup) – well-known for the dreamy unintelligibility of their lyrics. Which of course leads to the dreamy unintelligibility of some of the promises being made around Brexit. Supporters of Brexit have argued that the UK need not be overly concerned with a ‘No deal’ Brexit. This ranges from positions that ‘No deal’ would not be “as frightening as people think” although there would be “some hiccups in the first year” (David Davies), and that although there may be “some disruption” Britain would “survive and prosper without a deal” (Jeremy Hunt), to arguments that the idea that ‘No deal’ would have a negative impact were “a fantasy of fevered minds” (Jacob Rees Mogg).
‘No deal’ means ‘no deal’
03 July 2019
L. Alan Winters CB is Professor of Economics and Director of the Observatory.
Last week I was challenged twice for using the term ‘no deal’. There is no such thing, I was told, because, even if the UK does not ratify the Withdrawal Agreement of 25th November 2018, there will still be plenty of deals. At the time I thought, for several reasons, that this was wrong in substance if not literally, but more recently I have concluded that it is also dangerous. Like we saw in the referendum campaign, it undermines informed debate by deliberately confusing the terminology.
‘The deal’ is an agreement between the EU and the UK ‘setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union’ (Article 50 – Treaty on European Union). ‘No deal’ is the absence of such a deal. For business and the economy, ‘no deal’ has come to mean the absence of a trade agreement under which the UK and the EU trade with each other on terms better than those provided for under the World Trade Organization. The former ‘no […]
Briefing Paper 34 – THE FUTURE OF UK-US TRADE: AN UPDATE
Within days of Mr Johnson becoming Prime Minister, President Trump announced that talks about a “very substantial” trade deal with the UK are under way. In this joint Briefing Paper with colleagues from Georgetown University and UKTPO fellows, we consider the effects that Brexit uncertainty is likely to have on the capacity of the UK to agree a deal with the US and ask whether a deal is politically even possible in the UK. We investigate key issues in negotiating a bilateral agreement: the backstop and the problems posed by the EU and US standards regimes. The paper also explores the prospects and pitfalls of the US Government guidelines for negotiations between the US and the UK; the US’s potential strategic position on services and the declining importance of the UK and Europe as traditional places of spending for US multinational corporations especially in the areas of information technology soft- and hardware. Overall we conclude that while the governments involved see obvious political attractions in a UK-US free trade agreement, a quick and economically significant conclusion to the talks seems unlikely.
Read Briefing Paper 34 – THE FUTURE OF UK-US TRADE: AN UPDATE
Briefing Paper 33 – WINNERS AND LOSERS FROM INTERNATIONAL TRADE: WHAT DO WE KNOW AND WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY?
Economists have long argued, and with good justification, that international trade brings overall benefits to economies. However, increasing trade is likely to create losers as well as winners. As the UK prepares to leave the EU and have an independent trade policy it is important to understand how future trade agreements, or policy changes, may affect economic outcomes such as prices, productivity and output, and through these, individuals and regions.
In this Briefing Paper, the authors provide a conceptual background of how trade changes may result in winners and losers – be these consumers, workers, regions, or industries, and give an overview of what the empirical evidence tells us about how developed economies have adjusted to changes in trade. They also consider potential policy responses that could help losers from international trade adjust, and ensure that the winners can take advantage of the new opportunities created by trade liberalisation.
Read Briefing Paper 33 – WINNERS AND LOSERS FROM INTERNATIONAL TRADE: WHAT DO WE KNOW AND WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY?
Launch and Panel Discussion at British Academy, 18 July 2019
Ambition and reality: a UK-South Korea free trade agreement
1st July 2019
Dr Minako Morita-Jaeger, International Trade Policy Consultant and Fellow, UK Trade Policy Observatory at the University of Sussex.
The British and South Korean governments settled on an agreement in principle on ‘trade continuity’ on 10 June. Although there is no official information on its content or duration, Dr Liam Fox, Secretary of State International Trade, tweeted that it would be a base for an ‘ambitious future free trade agreement (FTA)’ when the UK leaves the EU. If so, what would be possible options for such an FTA? And how realistic are these ambitions? […]
The Writing on the Wall: FDI Inflows and Brexit
28 June 2019
Nicolo Tamberi is a Research Assistant in Economics for the UK Trade Policy Observatory. Dr Ingo Borchert is Senior Lecturer in Economics at the University of Sussex and a fellow of the Observatory.
On Wednesday, the Department for International Trade (DIT) released its official statistics on inward foreign direct investments (FDI) for the financial year 2018-19.[1] As stated by the DIT, these data measure the inflow of ‘new investment, expansion, and mergers & acquisition’ projects, both publicly announced and not. […]
Dispute Resolution in EU Trade Agreements: A Preliminary Glimpse of a New World Order
26 June 2019
Erika Szyszczak is a Research Professor in Law at the University of Sussex and a Fellow of UKTPO
The Dispute Mechanism Systems (DMS) in many trade agreements have lain dormant because countries preferred to use the World Trade Organization (WTO), with its Appellate mechanisms, as the forum to resolve international disputes. This may change in the coming years as the confidence in, and reliability of the WTO, is slowly paralysed by the disruptive attitude of the United States. One question that emerges is whether the use of EU dispute resolution mechanisms offer a faster and clearer approach towards dispute resolution and might serve as a model for future regional trade treaties. […]
